

Appendix

On Some Current Proposals

A.1. Introduction

In the forgoing chapters, I have maintained that there are two sources of scope interaction. The wide scope reading of a QP α over a QP β (henceforth $WSR\langle\alpha, \beta\rangle$) may obtain (i) through LF compositional computation or (ii) due to MINOR, an extra-grammatical operation. Since the recognition of more than one scope-taking strategies is not uncommon in the recent tradition, one may wonder how the claims pursued in the previous chapters differ from those in other works. In this appendix, I will briefly review two of such works, namely Beghelli & Stowell (= B&S) 1997, and Reinhart 1997.

A.2 Remarks on Beghelli & Stowell 1997

B&S (1997) assume, on one hand, that all instances of wide scope readings are generated through LF compositional computation, and at the same time (i) create a system that is radically different from the standard system, and (ii) maintain that there are two distinguished bases for wide scope readings. My interest here is to evaluate if it is necessary to assume the dichotomy they put forth.

B&S (1997) claim that the grammatical basis of $WSR\langle\alpha, \beta\rangle$, where α is either *every NP* or *each NP* and β is a QP of any type, must be distinguished from that of $WSR\langle\alpha, \beta\rangle$, where α is a QP that is not *every NP* or *each NP* and β is a QP of any type. According to their claim, $WSR\langle QP_{Sub}, QP_{Obj}\rangle$ in (1a)-(1c) must be distinguished from

WSR<QP_{Sub}, QP_{Obj}> in (1d)-(1e), where QP_{Sub} stands for a subject QP, and QP_{Obj} for an object QP.

- (1) (= B&S 1997 (19))
- a. Tom, Dick, and Hary read two books about India.
 - b. Three boys read two books about India.
 - c. All the boys read two books about India.
 - d. Every boy read two books about India.
 - e. Each boy read two books about India.

To explain how they reach this conclusion, I must first introduce some of their fundamental assumptions, which are rather different from those in the standard approach. Under the standard approach, a given QP α has a quantificational interpretation (i.e., is of <et, t>); thus its ability to be distributed (= distributivity) is inherent in α . QR is optional, but a QP that is not the sister of an element that denotes a one-place predicate cannot be interpreted unless it undergoes QR. B&S (1997), on the other hand, adopt the assumptions in (2).

- (2)
- a. No QP inherently possesses distributivity; all QPs are interpreted as some kind of 'group', cf. B&S 1997: Section 2.7, p.85.
 - b. QR is strictly feature-driven; each QP bears a feature depending on what type it is, and moves to the spec of a projection to check off its feature, B&S 1997:Section 2.4, pp.77-78.

Besides [+ wh], [+ AgrS], and [+ AgrO], among the features that they claim to exist are, [+ dist_(ributive)], [+ Ref_(erential)], and [+ Share], and these features are checked off at

the specs of DistP, RefP, and ShareP respectively. The QP types listed in (3) are among the classifications they assume, cf. B&S, pp.73-77.

(3) a. Distributive-Universal QPs

"These are QPs headed by *every* or *each*, which occur only with singular nouns," and they may carry [+ dist].

b. Group-Denoting QPs

These include "indefinite QPs headed by *a*, *some*, *several*, bare-numeral QPs like *one student*, *three students*, ... , and definite QPs like *the students*," and they may carry [+ Ref] or [+ Share], but not [+ dist].

c. Counting QPs

"These include decreasing QPs with determiners like *few*, *fewer than five*, *at most six*, and generally cardinality expressions built by modified numerals (e.g., *more than five*, *between six and nine*, *more (students) than (teachers)*, ...), and they cannot carry [+ dist], [+ Ref], or [+ Share].

To motivate the two distinguished bases for wide scope readings noted above, they further adopt the following assumptions.

(4) a. A QP receives distributivity at the spec of the DistP, but not at the spec of a functional projection other than the DisP, cf. B&S 1997, pp.91-92.

b. A QP in the spec of a projection other than the DistP must make use of an independent covert distributor in order to take wide scope with respect to another element, cf. B&S 1997, p.94.

Every NP and *each NP* carry the [+ dist] feature; hence, they receive distributivity from the DistP. The other types of QPs, on the other hand, must utilize an independent covert

distributor to give rise to wide scope readings. Hence, wide scope readings involving *every NP* or *each NP* must be distinguished from those with the other types of QPs.

In what follows, I do not evaluate the validity of the assumptions in (2) and (3) since such a task necessarily involves the evaluation of works other than the work under review, such as Beghelli (1995) and Szabolzci (1997b), which presumably establish these assumptions. I will instead assume for the sake of discussion that each of these assumptions is motivated independently, and focus on the arguments B&S provide in support of the assumptions in (4).

In support of the assumptions in (4), they provide three kinds of arguments. First, they argue, based on the contrast in (5), that the distributivity associated with *every NP* or *each NP* is different from that accompanied by the other types of QPs.

(5) (= B&S 1997 (17))

- a. All the boys surrounded the fort.
- b. ?Every boy surrounded the fort.
- c. ?Each boy surrounded the fort.

Second, they observe that (6d)-(6e) allow the reading where each boy read a book that no body except him or her read, but (6a)-(6c) does not, and the reading that (6a)-(6c) allow is only that some other book mentioned previously in the discourse is read by the people the subject QP refers to, and they conclude once again that the distributivity associated with *every NP* or *each NP* is different from that accompanied by the other types of QPs.

(6) (= B&S 1997 (20), slightly adapted)

- a. The boys read a different book.

- b. Five boys read a different book.
- c. All the boys read a different book.
- d. Every boy read a different book.
- e. Each (of the) boy(s) read a different book.

Third, they put forth the generalization that $WSR\langle QP_{Obj}, QP_{Sub}\rangle$ obtains in the basic order only if the QP_{Obj} is either *every NP* or *each NP*. They, for example, claim that (7d)-(7e) give rise to $WSR\langle QP_{Obj}, QP_{Sub}\rangle$, but not (7a)-(7c).

(7) (Based on B&S 1997 (21))

- a. A boy read Ulysses and Dubliners.
- b. A boy read two books.
- c. A boy read all the books.
- d. A boy read every book.
- e. A boy read each book.

They argue that this generalization can be accounted for once we recognize the two grammatical bases for wide scope readings sketched above, together with the assumption that the DistP, other functional projections, and a covert distributor are represented at LF in a certain way.

I would like to point out, however, that none of their arguments is conclusive. First, the fact regarding (5) that *every NP* and *each NP* cannot have non-distributive construal while the other types of QPs can does not preclude the possibility that the latter possess the same distributivity that *every NP* and *each NP* have.

Second, the alleged contrast with *a different N* in (6) does not justify us to postulate the different types of distributivity. Recall that not only *every NP* and *each NP*, but

also the other types of QPs, can give rise to wide scope readings (e.g., (1)). Precisely for that reason, they make a stipulation that the other types of QPs make use of an independent covert distributor. Once the covert distributor is introduced, the other types of QPs can be semantically on a par with *every NP* and *each NP* in terms of their distributability over *a different N*, unless additional statements are made to differentiate them. This makes us doubt their factual evaluation regarding (6). If the reported judgments regarding (6) are correct, on the other hand, we are led to assume that a QP that is not *every NP* or *each NP* can never take wide scope with respect to another QP. Either way, we are yet to see the evidence that there are two distinguished grammatical bases for wide scope readings.

Finally, I disagree with the generalization on which they base the third argument. We have observed in Chapter 2 that $WSR\langle QP_{Obj}, QP_{Sub} \rangle$ may obtain in the basic order even when the QP_{Obj} is not *every NP* or *each NP* as long as the speaker can refer to a specific group with it. Furthermore, the observation in Chapter 2 that when $WSR\langle QP_{Obj}, QP_{Sub} \rangle$ can obtain in the basic order, the interpretive restriction is imposed on the clause-mates of the QP_{Obj} , whether or not the QP_{Obj} is *every NP*, *each NP*, or a QP of another type, suggest that $WSR\langle QP_{Obj}, QP_{Sub} \rangle$ where the QP_{Obj} is *every NP* or *each NP* should not be differentiated from $WSR\langle QP_{Obj}, QP_{Sub} \rangle$ where the QP_{Obj} is a QP of another type.

Hence, I conclude that it is not necessary to subdivide wide scope readings through LF compositional computation in the way B&S do.

A. 3. Remarks on Reinhart 1997

Reinhart (1997) adopts the standard analysis that $WSR\langle\alpha, \beta\rangle$, where α and β are QPs, obtains through the compositional computation applied to the LF in (8).

(8) $[\Psi \alpha [\Psi \beta [\Psi \dots t_\alpha/t_\beta [\dots t_\beta/t_\alpha \dots]]]]$, where Ψ stands for an element that denotes a one-place predicate.

She, however, assumes an additional scope-taking strategy known as *the choice function strategy*, which allows indefinites to take independent scope (but not wide scope) with respect to another scope-bearing element.

In Sections A.3.1, I briefly summarize the choice function analysis Reinhart proposes, as well as the empirical materials that motivate it. Section A.3.2 spells out how the choice function strategy differs from MINOR, an extra-grammatical operation, proposed in the foregoing chapters. I then suggest in Section A.3.3 that the empirical materials that motivate the choice function analysis are better captured by MINOR, and the choice function strategy needs not be assumed.

A.3.1. The choice function analysis

To review how Reinhart (1997) puts forth the choice function analysis, let us first consider (9).

(9) a. (= Reinhart 1997 (51a), p.364)

If we invite two philosophers, Max will be offended.

b. (= Reinhart 1997 (62), p.367, which is cited from Ruys 1995)

If three relatives of mine die, I will inherit a house.

We can truthfully utter (9a) in the situation where Max gets offended only if two specific philosophers are invited, and the invitation of two philosophers may not be sufficient to

make Max mad. Similarly, (9b) can be true in the situation where the death of three relatives of the speaker may not get him or her a house. On the basis of this, Reinhart concludes (10).

(10) Indefinites can take scope over an island.

One possible counterargument for (10) comes from Fodor & Sag (1982) who assume that an indefinite can be analyzed as either a quantificational element or a referential expression. Given their assumption, the observation regarding (9) above straightforwardly follows. Expecting such a counterargument, Reinhart puts forth examples like the following:

(11) (= Reinhart 1997 (68a), p.374)

Most linguists have looked at every analysis that solves some problem.

Reinhart points out that (11) can be true in the situation where most of the linguists in a given context have each investigated one specific problem and looked at every analysis that solves it. She goes on to say that the availability of such an interpretation is not expected under the Fodor & Sag analysis since what the analysis gives us is only (i) the reading where most of the linguist investigated the same one problem or (ii) the reading where they have looked at every analysis that solves a problem, and each of them has possibly investigated more than one problems. Maintaining (10), she takes the interpretation of (11) under discussion as evidence that *some problem* takes intermediate scope between *most linguists* and *every analysis*.

A question is how to account for (10). She considers two possible approaches one might pursue and demonstrates that both fall short. One approach is to assume QR to be insensitive to island constraints at the expense of giving up the parallelism between overt

and covert movement (henceforth the QR approach). Reinhart argues that such an approach fails to generate the reading we need to account for, but generates an unattested reading. She, for example, points out that under this approach (9b) is represented as (12a) at LF, where *three relatives of mine* is moved out of the island, and the reading in (12b), an unavailable reading for (9b), is expected to be available. (12b) would mean that there are three relatives such that for each of them, I will inherit a house if she or he dies. Furthermore, the reading that (9b) has, namely, the one that the speaker gets a house only if three specific relatives of his or her die, cannot be accounted for.

(12) (= Reinhart 1997 (63), p.367)

- a. [three relatives of mine]_i [if e_i die, I will inherit a house]
- b. \exists three x (relative of mine (x) & (x dies \rightarrow I inherit a house))

Reinhart's remarks on the QR approach are summarized as follows. In order to generate the 'specific-relative reading' for (9b), the operator, i.e., *three*, must scope out of an island while its distributor stays within the island. But such an option is not available under the QR approach, since this approach does not allow an operator to be separated from its distributor.

The other approach she considers is to apply unselective binding, originally proposed in Heim 1982 independently of the issue that concerns Reinhart (1997), to island contexts (henceforth the unselective-binding approach). This line of thinking is actually executed in Beghelli 1993. In this approach, a QP is a restricted variable or set variable, and is bound by a higher existential quantifier that is inserted at LF; (9a), for example, is represented as (13) at LF.

(13) (= Reinhart 1997 (51b), p.364)

$$\exists Y((|Y|=2 \ \& \ Y = \{x \mid \text{philosopher}(x) \ \& \ \text{we invite } x\}) \rightarrow (\text{Max will be offended}))$$

This approach does not face the problem of the QR approach. Note that the operator \exists in (13) is outside the island, but the relevant distribution is done within. Reinhart points out, however, that this approach faces a serious semantic problem. She states on p.364 as follows: "[A]ll that [(13)] says is that there is some set, such that if it has two members who are philosophers that we invite, Max will be offended. There are many sets that meet this requirement (not only non-philosopher sets, but also the null set). So the sentence ends up a necessary truth." According to her, the problem of this approach lies in that the restrictor of a QP must stay within an island.

So how can we account for (10)? Reinhart proposes as a solution the choice function analysis, which is a modification of the unselective binding approach. In this analysis, a QP is a choice function variable rather than a restricted variable or set variable, and it is bound by a higher existential quantifier, just as in the unselective binding approach. *Three relatives of mine* in (9b), for example, is analyzed as a choice function that selects one set from sets of three relatives of the speaker, and the sentence as a whole is represented as (14).

(14) (= Reinhart 1997 (81b), p.382)

$$\exists f(\text{CH}(f) \wedge (f(\text{three relatives of mine}) \text{ die} \rightarrow \text{I inherit a house}))$$

The problem the QR approach faces does not concern this analysis just in the same way that it is not a problem for the unselective-binding approach. Regarding this, Reinhart makes the following remark on p.382. "The indefinite is interpreted in situ. ... Thus, in

[(14)] there is no new predicate formed at the covert structure. The only predicate which takes a set argument is *die*, hence it is only this predicate that can distribute. So we derive only the interpretation the sentence indeed has: that there is a set of relatives, such that if each one of them dies, I inherit a house." It is also the case that the choice function analysis does not face the problem of the unselective binding approach. As noted above, *three relatives of mine* in (9b), for example, is analyzed as a choice function that selects one set from sets of three relatives of the speaker; crucially, the function ranges over only the speaker's relatives. In this approach, therefore, restrictors are not considered as a part of an LF; hence they need not stay within an island.

A.3.2. Differences between the choice function analysis and MINOR

The choice function differs from MINOR, an extra-grammatical operation, proposed in the forgoing chapters; for the choice function strategy, allowing the insertion of existential closure at LF, makes use of LF compositional computation to derive a given scope interpretation, but MINOR makes reference to a representation other than an LF.

We can also empirically differentiate the two. While MINOR is meant to capture certain kinds of wide scope readings, the choice function strategy does not generate wide scope readings; the latter allows a QP to take independent scope, but not wide scope, with respect to another scope-bearing element. Take (15a) as an example. Under the choice function analysis, (15a) is represented as (15b) if *two professors* is interpreted as a choice function variable, and *ten student* as a quantificational element, or as (15c) if both of them are interpreted as choice function variables.

(15) a. Ten students greeted two professors.

b. $\exists f (\text{CH}(f) \wedge (\exists 10 x (\text{student}(x) \wedge (x \text{ greeted } f(\text{two professors}))))))$

- c. $\exists f_2 \exists f_1 (\text{CH}(f_1) \wedge \text{CH}(f_2) \wedge (f_1 \text{ (ten students) greeted } f_2 \text{ (two professors)}))$

Notice that neither (15b) nor (15c) express the reading in (16a) in which *two professors* takes wide scope with respect to *ten students*. (15b) and (15c) only express the readings in (16b) and (16c) respectively.

- (16) a. There are two professors such that each of them has ten students who greeted him or her.
 b. There are two professors such that there are ten students who greeted them.
 c. There are two professors and ten students such that they greeted them.

It is therefore obvious that we must assume MINOR even if we adopt the choice function strategy. Now the question is whether or not we must assume the choice function analysis in addition to MINOR.

A.3.3. Do we really need the choice function strategy?

To determine if it is necessary to assume the choice function analysis in addition to MINOR, we must consider whether or not MINOR can account for the empirical materials that motivate the choice function analysis. In other words, we must see if MINOR can bring about the specific philosophers/relatives reading in (9) and the intermediate-scope reading in (11). (9) and (11) are repeated here for convenience.

- (9) a. (= Reinhart 1997 (51a), p.364)

If we invite two philosophers, Max will be offended.

- b. (= Reinhart 1997 (62), p.367, which is cited from Ruys 1995)

If three relatives of mine die, I will inherit a house.

- (11) (= Reinhart 1997 (68a), p.374)

Most linguists have looked at every analysis that solves some problem.

In Chapter 3, we came to understand a number of properties associated with MINOR. Some of them are listed in (17).

(17) a. (= Chapter 3 (53))

MINOR includes the substantiation of a specific group that is 'compatible with' the denotation of a QP.

b. (= Chapter 3 (55))

MINOR operates on a domain consisting of A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n , where A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n are major constituents of the same clause.

c. (= Chapter 3 (56))

MINOR is an operation that makes one element to bear clausal scope, and is allowed only once per its domain.

Partly based on the properties in (17), I have speculated that MINOR is an operation that applies to a domain consisting of A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n , where A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n are major constituents of the same clause, and create a mental representation where a specific group, which is 'grabbed' from some cognitive domain other than the lexicon of a given language on the basis of the lexical information of an NP/a QP in the domain of the operation, is associated with one place predicate, which is formed on the basis of the lexical information of the rest of the elements in the domain. I have speculated that the wide scope reading of *three professors over more than two students* in (18) is, for example, due to the representation in (19).

(18) (= Chapter 3 (58))

(Context: You investigate how many students visited Prof. A, Prof. B, and Prof. C, and report the result.)

More than two students visited three professors.

(19) (= Chapter 3 (59))

$$\{a, b, c\} \dashv\vdash \lambda x \exists y (\textit{visited}(x, y) \wedge \textit{more-than-two}(y) \wedge \textit{student}(y))$$

To make the following discussion concrete, I assume below that MINOR is the operation I have just sketched, and consider if MINOR can give rise to the readings in (9) and (11) under discussion. First, the specific relative reading in (9b) can emerge if MINOR applies to the conditional clause. When (9b) is uttered, for example, in the situation where the speaker talked about the three relatives of her, John, Bill, and Tom, the conditional clause can be interpreted due to MINOR, i.e., due to the representation in (20).

(20) $\{j, b, t\} \dashv\vdash \lambda x (\textit{die}(x))$

Note that (20) gives us the reading under discussion, i.e., in order for the speaker to inherit a house, John and Bill and Tom must die, and the death of three relatives of the speaker may not get him or her a house. Incidentally, this analysis does not face the problem that the QR approach fails to overcome (see Section A.3.1) since MINOR takes place within the antecedent clause, and thus the relevant distribution is executed locally. Furthermore, the problem that the unselective-binding approach faces (see Section A.3.1) is not a problem to this approach, just as it is not to the choice function analysis, i.e., the restrictor is not a part of the representation in (20).

This analysis receives support from the following empirical materials. First, it seems that a given QP α does not appear to take scope over an island if the speaker does not refer to a specific group with α . For instance, unlike (9b), the examples in (21) do not give rise to the specific relative reading. This contrast is expected from (17a), one of the properties associated with MINOR.

(21) If three or more relatives of mine die, I will inherit a house.

If 25% or more of my relatives die, I will inherit a house.

Second, it seems that in a given clause only one indefinite can appear to take scope over an island, as illustrated in (22), and this generalization also follows from (17c), one of the properties associated with MINOR.

(22) a. If three boys approached two girls, John will be mad.

b. If many professors recommended some student, John will be mad.

Let me explain the point in detail, using (22a). Suppose that Paul, Bill, and Ken each approached two girls. In this situation, (22a) does not necessary entail that John is mad if the boys that the speaker has in mind are, for example, Tom, Paul, and Tim. Now suppose that Tom, Paul, and Tim are the boys the speaker has in mind, and each of them approached two girls. In this situation, (22a) seems to entail that John is mad, indicating that only one indefinite can 'take scope over' an island. We can also illustrate the same point from a different perspective. Suppose that Mary and Sue are each approached by three boys. In this situation, (22a) does not necessary entail that John is mad if the girls that the speaker has in mind are, for example, Sue and Kathy. Now suppose that the girls that the speaker has in mind is Sue and Kathy, and each of them was approached by three boys. In this situation, (22a) entails that John is mad, pointing to the same conclusion.

Let us now turn to the intermediate scope reading in (11). How precisely MINOR can give rise to the reading under discussion is not straightforward. I wish to speculate that the reading emerges when two instances of MINOR occur; one applies to the relative clause, and the other to the matrix clause. To illustrate the proposal more con-

cretely, consider the scenario that the speaker utters (11) to describe the situation where the linguists under discussion are A, B, C, D, E, and F, and A, B, C, and D are interested in solving Problems 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. First, one instance of MINOR applies to the matrix clause, and the representation in (23) is constructed.

(23) $\{a, b, c, d\} \dashv\vdash \lambda x \exists y (look-at(x, y) \wedge N(y) \wedge analysis-that-solves-some-problem(y))$, where N = the total number of analyses that solve a given problem

Then, another instance of MINOR takes place, as (23) is unpacked with regard to each of the linguists, as illustrated in (24).

(24) $\exists y (look-at(a, y) \wedge N(y) \wedge [\{1\} \dashv\vdash \lambda z (y \text{ solves } z)]) \wedge$
 $\exists y (look-at(b, y) \wedge N(y) \wedge [\{2\} \dashv\vdash \lambda z (y \text{ solves } z)]) \wedge$
 $\exists y (look-at(c, y) \wedge N(y) \wedge [\{3\} \dashv\vdash \lambda z (y \text{ solves } z)]) \wedge$
 $\exists y (look-at(d, y) \wedge N(y) \wedge [\{4\} \dashv\vdash \lambda z (y \text{ solves } z)])$, where N = a total number of analyses that solve a given problem

The following discussion supports this line of thinking, i.e., the 'intermediate scope' reading involves two instances of MINOR. First, the reading does not obtain if the speaker does not refer to a specific group with the matrix subject; it is difficult to take the examples in (25), for instance, as giving rise to the 'intermediate scope' reading. This observation follows, once we assume that the reading under discussion involves MINOR applying to the matrix clause.

(25) a. If more than 40% of the linguists look at every analysis that solves some problem, the field will advance greatly.

- b. If 10 or more linguists look at every analysis that solves some problem, the field will advance greatly.

Second, it seems also be the case that the 'intermediate scope' reading obtains only when MINOR takes place in the relative clause. For example, the reading under discussion does not obtain if a given indefinite in the relative clause cannot be understood as referring to a specific group, as illustrated in (26).

- (26) a. Most linguists looked at every analysis that solves 50% or more of the problems.
- b. Most linguists looked at every analysis that solves more than 3 problems.

Furthermore, only one indefinite in the relative clause can appear to take intermediate scope, as illustrated in (27).

- (27) a. Most linguists greeted every professor that recommended some scholar for some position.
- b. Most linguists approached every professor that introduced three publishers to some scholar.

To sum up so far, we have not only acknowledged that the MINOR analysis seems to be able to capture the empirical materials that motivate the choice function analysis, but also identified two generalizations that immediately follow from the properties of MINOR. The two generalizations are summarized in (28) for convenience.

- (28) a. A given indefinite α can appear to take scope over an island only if the speaker refer to a specific group with α .
- b. Of a given clause, only one major constituent can appear to take scope over an island.

Given that MINOR seems able to capture the empirical materials that motivate the choice function analysis, the latter seems to be superfluous. Furthermore, to maintain the choice function analysis, it is necessary to establish the generalizations in (28) on an independent ground. In fact, noticing contrasts analogous to the ones between (9b) and (21) and between (11) and (26), Reinhart qualifies the generalization in (10), saying that only a subset of indefinites can scope out of an island, i.e., be analyzed as choice function variables. She puts forth the following classifications of indefinites, and attempts to motivate them independently, cf. Reinhart 1997, pp.383-384.

- (29) a. Items that cannot scope out of an island
 less than three NP, more than three NP, exactly three NP, at least three NP,
 three or more NP, between three and five NP, etc.
- b. Items that can scope out of an island
 an NP, some NP, three NP, many NP, which NP, etc.

Even if the generalizations in (28) are established on an independent ground, however, the choice function analysis fails to account for the contrast between (11) and (25) regarding the (un)availability of the 'intermediate scope' reading. Under the choice function analysis, the 'intermediate scope' reading in (11) emerges when (11) is analyzed as (30a), and nothing prevents us from analyzing, for example, (25a) as (30b) to generate the reading under discussion.

- (30) a. (= Reinhart 1997 (68c), p. 357)
- For most linguists x , $\exists f (CH(f) \wedge \forall y ((analysis(y) \wedge y \text{ solves } f(\text{problem})) \rightarrow x$
 looked at $y))$

- b. For 40% or more of the linguists x , $\exists f (\text{CH}(f) \wedge \forall y ((\text{analysis}(y) \wedge y \text{ solves } f(\text{problem})) \rightarrow x \text{ looked at } y))$

On the basis of the above discussion, therefore, I would like to reject the choice function analysis altogether. To the extent that the analysis I have developed using MINOR is on the right track, it turns out that the generalization that indefinites take scope over an island is incorrect.